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Abstract
With the change in payment system from retrospective to prospective for National
Health Insurance (NHI) patients, X Hospital must perform strategic efforts for managing
the acceptance of service cost (46%) and facility cost (54%) for every Indonesia
Case-Based Group (INA-CBG) payment. This study aimed to describe the difference in
service cost and facility cost acceptance based on the hospital’s billing and INA-CBG
payment plus additional costs for patients with wards of an upgraded class, and it
also describes X Hospital’s strategic efforts toward universal health coverage (UHC).
This study has an observational-descriptive design, and it collects quantitative and
qualitative data. For this purpose, a total of 432 hospital bills and INA-CBG payments
for NHI inpatients in January-February 2016 are collected, and in-depth interviews
with several participants from the management, service providers, and administration
are conducted. The results show that the total payment acceptance of INA-CBG plus
additional costs is lower than the hospital’s billing. The total service cost acceptance
increased by IDR 99,034,017.00. The highest increase came from the internist ward
and the highest decrease, from the obstetric ward. The total facility cost acceptance
decreased by IDR 279,521,491.00. All wards showed a decrease, with the highest
decrease coming from the internist ward. The proportion of service and facility costs
must be balanced with behavior management of healthcare providers, arrangement
of clinical pathways, optimization of various costs without reducing the quality of care,
providing the hospital’s formulary and ensuring usage of drugs and medical devices,
and using the hospital management and information system to improve efficiency.
By doing so, X Hospital will become ready to provide high-quality healthcare services
under UHC.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Universal health coverage (UHC) is defined as equal access to health services in terms
of promotion, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation [8]. In January 1, 2014, the
Indonesian government committed to achieve UHC by establishing the ”Jaminan Kese-
hatan Nasional” ( JKN) or National Health Insurance (NHI) program. JKN will be the
embryo of the UHC implementation planned for 2019 in Indonesia [1]. The government
will run the entire public healthcare service through the NHI. The NHI is organized
by one institution, the ”Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial” (BPJS). The BPJS will
manage healthcare costs, including the benefits package received by NHI participants
[11]. Costs for NHI patients will be based on Indonesia Case-Based Group (INA-CBG)
patients, and BPJS will pay the hospital bill for a package of services based on group-
ing disease diagnoses [4]. The guaranteed benefits packages of NHI healthcare will
cover comprehensive medical needs and services including promotive, preventive,
curative, and rehabilitative services and drugs, materials, and medical consumables.
Service providers (healthcare centers, clinics, family physicians, and hospitals) must
provide services according to the benefits package that has been determined by a
predetermined fee (prospective payment system). A prospective payment system is
a reimbursement method in which healthcare payment is made based on a predeter-
mined, fixed amount [1]. Under prospective payment, it is profitable for hospitals to
reduce the lengths of stays and to increase the number of treated cases [3].
The healthcare financing system of NHI Indonesia is based on the social health
insurance system, and its aims to improve access, equity, quality, and cost efficiency.
The payment system for NHI patients uses capitation payments for NHI patients and
INA-CBG payments for NHI inpatients. The costs to be paid by the BPJS are stipulated by
the Ministry of Health through the “Peraturan Menteri Kesehatan Republik Indonesia
Nomor 59 Tahun 2014 tentang Standard Tarif Pelayanan Kesehatan dalam Penyeleng-
garaan Program Jaminan Kesehatan.” The tariffs applied in NHI Indonesia require valid
calculations to avoid harming service providers and reducing the quality of services
itself [14].
X Hospital is a B-type public hospital that has been implementing NHI since January 1,
2014. For performing operational activities, X hospital accepts the local government’s
budget and receives revenues from various sources including general patients with
no insurance; patients with ”JamKesDa”, ”JamKesProv”, or company insurance; and
NHI patients with INA-CBG payments. Each patient uses a different payment system.
Patients with no insurance or with company insurance pay hospital costs based on
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retrospective payment systems. A retrospective payment system provides the fees
to be paid by the patient after the services are provided [13]. For patients with NHI
insurance, the service cost will be paid by the BPJS by using a capitation payment
for NHI patients and INA-CBG payment for NHI inpatients. There must be a difference
between the acceptance of INA-CBG payments and hospital tariffs because of the
change in payment system from a retrospective to a prospective payment system.
Significant efforts should be made to improve existing mechanisms for the internal
financing of healthcare [9].
Hospitals’ acceptance of INA-CBG payments for NHI inpatients will be used to pay
the service costs for service providers through the remuneration system and to pay for
the hospitals’ facility costs. The proportion of service costs in public hospitals is 30%–
50% of Indonesia Case-Based Group (INA-CBG) payment [6]. The proportion of service
costs and facility costs is determined by the hospital itself. X hospital has determined
the proportion of service costs and facility costs to be 46% and 54%, respectively,
from every INA-CBG payment plus additional costs if NHI patients want to upgrade the
class of the ward.
2. METHODS
Figure 1: Difference in Acceptance in X Hospital’s Scheme.
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This study is an observational descriptive study, and it aims to describe the differ-
ence in acceptance between service costs and facility costs based on the hospital’s
billing and INA-CBG payment plus additional costs for NHI inpatients who upgrade the
class of theward (Fig. 1); it shows the strategic effort of X Hospital toward UHC. Primary
datawas obtained from in-depth interviews of several participants frommanagement,
service providers, and administration. Secondary data was obtained from 432 hospital
bills and INA-CBG payments plus additional costs for NHI inpatients who upgraded the
class of their ward in January and February 2016.
3. RESULTS
The results of in-depth interviews showed that the hospital management and health-
care providers have directly contributed to the result. Healthcare providers played a
direct role in controlling the quality and costs of the hospital. Behavior control for
NHI patients differed from that for non-NHI patients. Non-NHI patients are charged
for all healthcare costs based on a retrospective or a free for service payment system;
however, for NHI patients, all healthcare costs are paid according to INA-CBG payment.
The hospital management arranges for clinical pathways and optimizes various cost
by reducing the length of stay without reducing the quality of care. X hospital will also
provide its formulary, ensure standard usage of drugs and medical devices, and use
its management and information system to improve hospital efficiency.
Table 1: Total acceptance based on hospital’s billing and INA-CBG payment plus additional costs.
Wards Total
Inpatient




Internist 102 448,421,720 465,942,530 17,520,630
Surgery 43 287,876,516 230,830,800 -57,045,716
Obstetric 104 581,230,450 399,369,650 -181,860,800
Pediatric 124 381,067,790 391,062,262 9,994,472
VIP 59 347,413,140 378,317,080 30,903,940
Total 432 2,046,009,616 1,865,522,142 -180,487,474
IDR: Indonesia Rupiah
4. DISCUSSION
Table 1 shows that total hospital acceptance based on INA-CBG payment plus the
additional cost of NHI inpatients in wards with an upgraded class is lower than the
hospital’s billing. Hospital loses were IDR 180,487,474. The obstetric and surgery wards
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Table 2: Service cost acceptance based on hospital’s billing and INA-CBG payment plus additional costs.
Wards Total
Inpatient
Service Cost Based on
Hospital’s Billing (IDR)





Internist 102 110,574,290 214,333,481 103,759,191
Surgery 43 138,415,780 106,182,168 -32,233,612
Obstetric 104 293,013,650 183,710,039 -109,303,611
Pediatric 124 117,348,288 179,888,641 62,540,353
VIP 59 99,754,160 174,025,857 74,271,697
Total 432 759,106,168 858,140,185 99,034,017
IDR: Indonesia Rupiah
Table 3: Facility cost acceptance based on hospital’s billing and INA-CBG payment plus additional cost.
Wards Total
Inpatient
Facility Cost Based on
Hospital’s Billing (IDR)





Internist 102 337,847,430 251,608,869 -86,238,561
Surgery 43 149,460,736 124,648,632 -24,812,104
Obstetric 104 288,216,800 215,659,611 -72,557,189
Pediatric 124 263,719,502 211,173,621 -52,545,881
VIP 59 247,658,980 204,291,223 -43,367,757
Total 432 1,286,903,448 1,007,381,957 -279,521,491
IDR: Indonesia Rupiah
showed negative differences, and the internist, pediatric, and VIP wards showed pos-
itive differences. This could be because INA-CBG payment is lower than the hospital
costs, and the capitation received from the UC scheme might not be enough to replace
these revenues [7]. One aim of using capitation is to provide a financial incentive for
increased efficiency in public hospitals [12]. Furthermore, the hospital’s tariffs may be
higher than the amount received from INA-CBG payments. These differences need to
be evaluated in detail. Hospitals need to reevaluate the rates for diagnosing diseases
in the obstetrics and surgical wards based on their unit costs to the hospital. This
difference may also be caused by imprecision in coding processes. In terms of the
hospital’s coding structure, the use of software, number of medical statisticians, and
experience of physicians seemed to be the most important factors [10]. The causes for
the differences between INA-CBG payment and hospital rates should be investigated,
especially in anticipation of an increase in NHI patient visits to the hospital. Moreover,
the fact that hospitalization will increase and that reporting of minor illnesses will
decrease (although not significantly) among rural residents actually supports the idea
that UHC benefits the poor more [2].
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Table 2 shows that the total acceptance of service cost increased by IDR 99,034,017.
The highest increase came from the internist ward and the highest decrease, from the
obstetric ward. The costs can sometimes be problematic. Some wards may receive
higher service costs than that based on the hospital’s billing, whereas others may
receive lower service costs than that based on the hospital’s billing. This is evidenced
by the hospital director’s statement that acceptance of service cost arise from 46%
of INA-CBG payments plus additional costs for NHI inpatients in wards of an upgraded
class. The acceptance of service cost is distributed to all healthcare providers in the
wards and the entire hospital staff based on the remuneration system. If a positive
difference is obtained from this cost, the service received is greater than the services
in the hospital’s billing. If a negative difference is obtained, the service received is
lesser than the services in the hospital’s billing.
Based on Table 3, the total facility acceptance cost decreased by IDR 279,521,491,
and all wards showed a decrease. The highest decrease came from the internist ward
and the lowest decrease, from the surgery ward. The internist ward showed a positive
difference in total acceptance and service cost acceptance, whereas the facility cost
acceptance showed the highest negative difference. A negative difference in facility
cost acceptance causes a financial loss to the hospital. However, to determine the
hospital’s financial loss, the difference between the facility acceptance cost and actual
cost incurred needs to be calculated. Based on accounting concepts, the surplus is
determined by comparing the income earned and expenses incurred by the hospital
[1]. The differences in acceptance can be caused by several factors such as class of
wards, number of diagnoses, and length of stay [5].
The results of in-depth interviews showed that the hospital management and
healthcare providers have directly contributed to the results. Healthcare providers
played a direct role in controlling the quality and cost at the hospital. Behavior control
for NHI patients differed from that for non-NHI patients. All healthcare costs are
charged to non-NHI patients based on a retrospective or free for service payment
system, and all healthcare costs for NHI patients are paid according to INA-CBG
payment. The hospital management arranges for clinical pathways and optimizes
various costs by reducing the length of stay without reducing the quality of care.
Longer lengths of stay seem to reduce the level of efficiency [12]. X Hospital also
provides its formulary, ensures standard usage of drugs and medical devices, and
uses its hospital management and information system to improve efficiency.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Hospitals will play an important role in helping Indonesia achieve UHC. Good financing
management of NHI patients will help provide high-quality healthcare with thorough
and efficient services. The proportion of service and facility costs must be balanced
with behavior management of healthcare providers, arrangement of clinical pathways,
optimization of various costs without reducing quality of care, providing the hospital’s
formulary and ensuring standard usage of drugs and medical devices, and using the
hospital’s management and information system to improve efficiency. By doing so, X
Hospital will be ready to provide UHC with high-quality healthcare services.
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